It's not bad faith per se, it's just ignorance. But that's a bit rude since it's a "problem" with the preexisting philosophy writings as well.

> Does it? You give no reason why.

>Doesn't sound very like the quote you're referencing to me. Do you think Zizek would agree with you here?

I was assuming that you read the article under discussion.

Here, I'll bold the relevant parts for you.

>Compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett have an elegant solution to the incompatibilists’ complaints about determinism: when incompatibilists complain that our freedom cannot be combined with the fact that all our acts are part of the great chain of natural determinism, they secretly make an unwarranted ontological assumption: first, they assume that we (the Self, the free agent) somehow stand outside reality, then they go on to complain about how they feel oppressed by the notion that reality in its determinism controls them totally. This is what is wrong with the notion of us being “imprisoned” by the chains of natural determinism: we thereby obfuscate the fact that we are part of reality, that the (possible, local) conflict between our “free” striving and the external reality that resists it is a conflict inherent in reality itself. That is to say, there is nothing “oppressive” or “constraining” about the fact that our innermost strivings are (pre)determined: when we feel thwarted in our freedom by the pressure of external reality, there must be something in us, some desire or striving, which is thus thwarted, but where do such strivings come from if not this same reality? Our “free will” does not in some mysterious way “disturb the natural course of things,” it is part and parcel of this course.... When a determinist claims that our free choice is “determined,” this does not mean that our free will is somehow constrained, that we are forced to act against our will—what is “determined” is the very thing that we want to do “freely,” that is, without being thwarted by external obstacles.

Do you see the bit about "the fact that all our acts are part of the great chain of natural determinism"? Do you see the bit about Zizek explicitly tying our actions to the inescapable bounds of a deterministic - i.e. "(pre)detetrmined" - universe? How he denies that our Self can be a "free agent" outside of those bounds? How he explicitly links our "strivings" and the reality which - in his proposition - has spawned them? And how about the bit on our free choice being "determined" - by that very same reality?

It's the compatibilists themselves that are happy to claim that determinism removes free choice. They just attempt to decouple choice and "free will" - and do so clumsily and incoherently.

In particular, Zizek's proposition is that a pre-deterimined choice is still consistent with "free will" - because "what is “determined” is the very thing that we want to do “freely,” that is, without being thwarted by external obstacles."

This falls apart in several places - perhaps most obviously in that in Zizek's own framing, there is no possibility of any "external obstacles" - because there is no possibility in his mind of anything "external" to the reality that both governs our "strivings" and determines their success or failure.

>"...that the (possible, local) conflict between our “free” striving and the external reality that resists it is a conflict inherent in reality itself."

In Zizek's proposition (and Burgis' far less able framing) we are simultaneously totally governed by the unshakeable, constant and accidental whims of reality - and also free to choose whatever path we like, provided it aligns exactly with the predetermined path laid out by that same reality.

The ultimate meaninglessness of Zizek's interpretation of determinism is almost breathtaking.

Intrinsic? Friendship would be an example. Scanlon devotes a chapter to this topic in his "What We Owe to Each Other." Anyway, value realists do not even need to assume that some values are intrinsic. Which values are intersubjective or even objective depends on whether there are facts that make corresponding value statements true and on the nature of these facts. Such facts could be moral facts, but they could also be aesthetic or prudential, for example, or there could be a naturalist position that grounds them in empirical facts about humans in general. It really depends on the kind of value theory you think is the right one.

As a metaethicist I'm undecided about this / don't think there is a clear solution. IMHO, claiming there are moral or aesthetic facts is in many ways problematic and dubious.

Of course there are options. They way you're thinking about choice here would render commonplace statements like "I could climb that fence but I don't feel like it" incoherent nonsense, because there wasn't any future in which I would have chosen to do so. That's a strong indication that you're operating with a notion of choice that doesn't line up with the what people generally mean by choice.

Choices are morally relevant where they give information about the decision maker, and that's where there are a number of options to take under a quite mundane sense of "option". There's a difference between jumping a fence because I wanted to and jumping one at gunpoint regardless of whether the universe is deterministic or not.

A deterministic universe doesn't forbid mental processes from affecting physical processes when mental processes are understood as physical process. But really, you didn't answer my question here. I don't see how even a dualistic universe helps allow free will to exist. What additional factor into a choice does it allow for that wasn't already there?

Again, you seem to be saying that for a choice to be free it must be made on the basis of something other than your character, experiences, beliefs, facts of the situation, and random chance. What else needs to influence it for it to be free and how does a nondeterministic universe allow for that when a deterministic one doesn't? So far you've just said that it means mental processes can be nondeterministic but why's that supposed to help?

I think that an nondeterministic universe poses problems for free will, because it means a less strong connection between beliefs/experiences and deliberation, as well as deliberation and action. Of course someone would make the exact same decision every time in the exact same situation: that decision is a reflection of who they were at the time. Why would we ever expect anything else? And to the extent a decision isn't reflective of who they are, it's less morally relevant!

I lean towards what's sometimes called "hard compatibility": that far from being incompatible with determinism, free will in fact might require it.

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Thanks for reading! What values do you find intrinsic?

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This is merely yet another question begging assertion given without argument:

> A deterministic universe neatly wipes out any such concerns as "reason responsiveness" or whatever other definition of free will you care to align on.

Does it? You give no reason why.

> Zizek's treasured quote that the author presents with such reverence boils down to accepting the lack of choice, and finding "freedom" in that unity with the universe, by recognizing that the "choice" you are making was in fact made by the very universe you are trying to affect, and only has meaning because of that commonality of source.

This is your take on it, but there is no analysis here. Why does it boil down to that? Not to mention that

> recognizing that the "choice" you are making was in fact made by the very universe you are trying to affect

Doesn't sound very like the quote you're referencing to me. Do you think Zizek would agree with you here?

But in general you don't actually elaborate any supposed conflict. You just assert there is one several times.

a) How does it imply you shouldn't vote?
b) How is that the fault of utilitarianism? That just sounds to me like a consequence of capitalism
c) I think you're referring to effective altruism there, which yes, is founded in utilitarianist principles. The point of effective altruism (and utilitarianism as a whole) is to produce the most good possible (which may involve working a lot to donate to charity, but Peter Singer warns against spreading yourself too thin, as it may actually affect your ability to spread goodness. "Secure your own mask [in the event of an emergency on a plane] first before assisting others" is a good analogy)

I'm fine with many things the author states but find the idea that axiology is not part of ethics somewhat counter-productive. In my opinion, the deontic realm the author talks about is one branch of ethics and axiology is another branch of ethics. That is also how it has been conceived traditionally. That the author wants to banish all axiology from ethics seems to be based on the idea that values are somehow personal and agent-relative from the start, but only few people would subscribe to this view. Even utilitarians have proposed more elaborate views of value, for example Harsanyi takes informed preferences under some veil of ignorance construction as the basis of his theory. I'm not a utilitarian, but I would defend axiology as an independent and inherently normative part of ethics that is not reducible to deontology (or vice versa).

To make this clear, however, I think that only part of value theory belongs to ethics. There are plenty of values that are not morally relevant.

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Some criticisms of utilitarianism: it implies you shouldn't vote; it deals poorly with unlikely (with hard to quantify probability) but potentially devastating events (e.g. people have used it to argue we should pump loads of money into businesses dubiously working on solutions to the potential AI apocalypse); it implies you should spend all of your time working for as much money as possible and give almost all of it away to charities with the largest marginal impact on reducing human suffering (so probably sorts of foreign aid like the stuff recommended on GiveWell), retaining only enough to scrape by on; it implies enslaving masses and hooking them up to neverending drugs to keep them constantly in a state of ignorant unthinking bliss is good; it implies if the resources to make someone stop suffering are more efficiently spent elsewhere, then that person should be killed. There are defences of course.

>If everyone's actions are predetermined though, can we really put the blame on people for acting the way they did? We would essentially be sentencing people for crimes they had no control over.

Yep it's perfectly fine to sentence those people. We sentence people to act as a deterrent and to protect society.

Yes I'm aware. And why is preserving this system important?

The basis for society's legal system is founded on the idea that we need to hold people accountable for their actions, which assumes that people have responsibility for the actions they makes. If everyone's actions are predetermined though, can we really put the blame on people for acting the way they did? We would essentially be sentencing people for crimes they had no control over.

Thanks for that explanaition, i am still new to the idea of determinism. I just find it interesting the whole idea of determinism and once i found out about it it made me rethink many aspects of life.

As a rule for myself i have found not to get too obssessed with the idea of determinism as it can feel pretty negative and consuming of your life.

I feel like free-will is a more natural human feeling to have however that doesnt mean it’s correct.

Thanks for your insight, pretty new to philosophy as a whole

I agree! But its also something that has to be accepted. I wouldn't say morality requires us to sacrifice ourselves for the public good. The acceptance condition shouldn't be left out in our definition of morality.

Many of my beliefs have formed due to my profession as a software engineer. "Random" numbers are not truly random... they are pseudo-random given a seed value to start with. I.e., pull n values from a random number generator that started with the same seed and you will get the same numbers out in the same order each time. I like to think of "god" as that generation function and of each universe having a unique seed value. Maybe all universes have the same rules, but for each "decision point" (whatever that is!), a different number was given and thus a different result.

The little computers between our ears can't extrapolate S(T + n) for more than a couple of variables and we also can't look at the state of other brains... so, we're left to be mostly reactive to whatever we observed in S(T - m). Responsibility is placed most easily with the observed. When a computer malfunctions, we deal with that instance... yeah.

Looking at parents or at DNA is really meta... the machine looks at itself... what does it see?

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In Chapter 2 of the Groundwork Kant lays out the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative, explaining how they work and giving examples of their use. If you read one thing of Kant it should be that.

Morality is not what a higher being says, it is what is logically better for well being and will reduce human suffering so that our human society can coordinate. I believe in Utilitarianism and Contractism with both with some touch of evolutionary genetics and cognitive revolution. Science have a say on morality as an imagined reality by cognitive revolution.

Yeah, just mentioned it in another comment but my understanding, though limited of quantum mechanics just implies that the world can be probabilistic but that just shifts causality to be the result of luck/randomness.

I think this is definitely an argument that kind of just never ends until we come to a better understanding of neuroscience/physics. At the end of the day though it seems valuable to have arguments, define concepts, etc.

I kind of see it as the ability to act as we desire, but not having the ability to desire what we desire. That definitely just circles back around to not being in control of our actions, but the main takeaway I took was the counterargument that we must come from somewhere as our definition of who we are is the sum of our experiences, environment, genetics, etc. If you take all that away then you are not really you anymore so you should kind of just, accept that I guess? Maybe you are right about the emotional aspect of it as this argument seems to hint that we should take some pride in our past. Kind of like, well we can't really have changed who we are up to now but the alternative is nothingness so let's try to make the most out of it.

Perhaps this is the natural conclusion even if deterministic that we are designed to come to? Giving people the illusion of free will helps encourage them to survive and make the most out of their life?