>By this definition my dresser has freedom to act.

No it doesn't... How did you come to that conclusion.?

Edit: To clarify I define free will as "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".

It's too "I'm this and this, and I believe in such and such" for my tastes. I like the early long serious ones.

Compatiblism: for when determinism gives you a big sad and you don't like it.

Almost on par?

Existential comics is the bomb!

Gotcha. To try to at least make compatibilism comprehensible:

If physicalism is true, then desires are some combination of physical states and/or processes.

Whether determinism is true or not, you are inevitably going to ‘choose’ those desires in exactly the libertarian free will sense, by definition. The only things you’re not free to choose are the things you don’t choose. You could have chosen differently - if a combination of processes in your mind had given a different result, which is to say, if you were a different person in the relevant sense (which could be quite minor in the case of an arbitrary choice, but major in the case of something that speaks to your core beliefs).

The only real difference between this and libertarian free will is the belief that desires aren’t fundamentally mysterious. It might founder on some other rock (if, for example, determinism is false, or if there’s some other property of free will not being captured here, or if there’s no such thing as ‘self’, or if you define brain processes as being outside of self), but hopefully it’s at least a bit more understandable how a person could believe that, and what exactly they believe.

If I psychologically prime a child to make the choice I prefer them to make such as give them two insignificant variants of the same choice (would you like to go to school now or in a few minutes?) they can feel free, no? Are they not compelled?

When the tiger starts running towards me, I feel a surge of adrenaline that allows me to climb a tree to safety. That may not feel free and yet every day I make choices with less urgency that are still ultimately about survival. I am not choosing to survive I am compelled.

Underneath whatever desire we think we have, how do we know there are no strings? Isn’t the point of a determined universe that there must be strings even if our intuition cannot see them? These desires are not an uncaused cause.

My intuition tells me all desire is manifest from the substrate and is not free ever, though I cannot define free so I have to go with some process of elimination to make that statement. My intuition tells me that we are always on strings due to our inability to fly or teleport but that other people feel free despite these constraints due to their acceptance of the constraints. My intuition tells me that constraints long applied get ignored. If I place a human being in the confines of a cell they will eventually stop testing the limits of that cell and perhaps then they will think they have free will again, intuitively, after some time.

If you want to define free will as any time you can make a decision that aligns with your expectations of what is possible without having to reflect on enfetterment you have not accepted as natural… then ok you have free will at times but it’s a rather absurd distinction to make. It does not seem to give rise to the moral premise the author wants.

Yes but what does this have to do with freewill?

> (1) That free will of some sort is a necessary condition for moral responsibility,

> (2) That moral responsibility exists regardless of whether determinism is true &

> (3) That free will wouldn’t exist in a deterministic universe

Number 2 seems to be the shakiest point. From the article, it seems that if my buddy flakes on lunch just to play video games then I'm blaming him so that means he is morally responsible and so I'm justified in being upset.

But I could just as easily say that everything was predetermined, he flaked, and I'm upset without assigning any morally responsibility. It's just his brain chemistry to sometimes be flakey. I'll take this into account in my future dealings with him.

Whether or not free will exists, my response is the same. So why do I have to keep this notion of free will around? Determinism doesn't support it. There's refutation of freewill and the only thing against it is my intuition. My intuition is often wrong and it's wrong again. There's no freewill.

By this definition my dresser has freedom to act. I can equally apply this definition to a computer program that controls a thermostat based on tenant law.

Do these objects have free will?

Compatibilism often reads to me as, "I will express my moral intuition, and I never could have done otherwise".

Correct me if I'm wrong lol.

What does voluntary mean? What does free from external coercion mean? Can you define free will without using the word free? Can you define free?

Also your definition doesn’t seem to make sense in a compatibilist view either. Can your decision be both determined and “free” from external influence?

I honestly suspect you can make free will mean whatever you want it to mean if you don’t have to define the word free and you go around thinking about it in the context of how you morally feel about the context in which people were acting.

Definitions are hard. I wouldn't call it all bad faith.

Why do we need free will for justice?

Imagine a robot that follows it's programming perfectly. If the robot commits a murder, we'd put it in jail all the same. Other robots might observe that robots can go to jail and then do a calculus that causes them to not do more murders.

We can achieve deterrence and removal without free will. The only part of our justice system that we would have to get rid of in the face of no free will is perhaps vengeance but we never wanted that in there anyway! Justice is improved by removing free will!

I'm sure there are other definitions, but I use something like free will is about "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".

Free will is key in morality and justice, so I like to understand how the courts define and use it. Lets use a real life example of how the Supreme Court considers free will.

​

>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do

In the case of R. v. Ruzic

>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.

The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.

>And so he claims they are compatible, but to do so he redefines free will, then claims he hasn't and that was the definition of it we were working with all along. It just isn't convincing to me. I'd like to be convinced, for a long time I thought I was missing something, but I'm now begining to believe I'm not missing anything.

I feel it's you who have redefined what free will means, you are using a definition that doesn't exist, is incoherent and no one outside of amateur philosophers actually use.

Most professional philosophers most are outright compatibilists.

>https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all

Lay people have incoherent ideas around free will, but when properly probed the majority have compatibilist intuitions.

>In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions… In one of the first studies, Nahmias et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine that, in the next century, humans build a supercomputer able to accurately predict future human behavior on the basis of the current state of the world. Participants were then asked to imagine that, in this future, an agent has robbed a bank, as the supercomputer had predicted before he was even born. In this case, 76% of participants answered that this agent acted of his own free will, and 83% answered that he was morally blameworthy. These results suggest that most participants have compatibilist intuitions, since most answered that this agent could act freely and be morally responsible, despite living in a deterministic universe.
>
>https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf

​

>Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If participants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a positive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views
>
>https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617

Then finally most/all court and justice systems use the compatibilist definition of free will. >It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do

In the case of R. v. Ruzic

>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.

The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.

So no, the compatibilist definition is what we have been using all along, it's you who have redefined it to be incoherent.

this is kind of an impossible discussion. whether we call it determinism or compatibilism or guided voluntarism or whatever, logic says that no man or woman can think or act beyond the constraints of the laws of nature (which may include some randomness. however, randomness does not make you any more in control, it just means that your actions were not predetermined). freedom to act would require freedom not to act. not acting on a desire only proves that other desires or constraints were stronger. so your previous take is still right and compatible with both determinism, some variants of voluntarism, and compatibilism, depending on definitions of these terms.

this is kind of an impossible discussion. whether we call it determinism or compatibilism or guided voluntarism or whatever, logic says that no man or woman can think or act beyond the constraints of the laws of nature (which may include some randomness. however, randomness does not make you any more in control, it just means that your actions were not predetermined). freedom to act would require freedom not to act. not acting on a desire only proves that other desires were stronger. so your previous take is still right and compatible with both determinism, some variants of voluntarism, and compatibilism, depending on definitions of these terms.

It's similar, in that I'm arguing we can't prove it doesn't exist and is perhaps self-evident. Obviously, no one here is going around "believing in things" simply because we can't prove them wrong. So whether or not this is a sound argument hinges on whether or not you think free will is self-evident.

I am not sure of that, myself, and I'm not convinced the answer is known to anyone. I don't think physics really answers that question. Neither does psychology or neuroscience.

>But the question remains about morality. How can I hold you morally responsible? After all, if you didn't choose to have that will, how is it your fault you have that will?

I like to see it in terms of impact on society. We should punish you to act as a deterrent to you and other people. We might also want to protect society by removing you from from committing more crimes.

Free will, fault and moral responsibility are concepts that are key for morality and justice. They make sense from an almost utilitarian point of view.

What I took from it is that I may be a Compatibilist - I believe the universe is completely deterministic, even though I also think "free will" is the human experience - because I am ignorant and beyond education in any relevant, meaningful sense... unless I somehow missed the point.

Why? Given the state of the universe at any time to be S(T):

• I do not have knowledge of S(0)
• I do not have knowledge of the current T
• I can not extrapolate a future state, S(T + n), with any degree of certainty, even locally
• I feel "free" in my decisions, because even though I cannot control what I desire, it seems like I can choose how to deal with desires
• I can never change any of the above

Acceptance of our inescapable ignorance is the key to never feeling "oppressed" by determinism... which is why I would feel pity for any omniscient beings that exist; god knows they're not free.

In terms of moral responsibility, perhaps it is helpful to view the universe systematically. "Responsibility" allows the system to self-correct and protect itself. If we are not the individuals that we seem to be, but parts of a whole, removing pieces that damage that whole is of benefit.

>What does “freedom to act” mean?

Just use the normal definition used in society. I generally like to refer to the legal system.

In a legal contract there might be certain conditions that restrict your freedom to act in certain ways.

It's about the "external" world influences on what we call a "person". So to what extent does the external world influence and control what the person can do.

So treat a "person" as a black box, that includes everything that goes into making up that person, so their DNA and all past environmental inputs that you would consider making a person what they are.

Then since that person is a black box, you can't know how they work. In such a situation would knowing the current environmental inputs be able to predict what that person does.

So lets use a real life situation.

You may offer that person the opportunity to commit to traffic drugs. In the normal case you can't completely know whether the person would traffic drugs, that person has the freedom to choose. (The fact they choose deterministically is irrelevant).

In another situation you threaten the person to kill the person's family if they don't traffic drugs. In this situation the external environment is limiting the freedom to act of the person. That person is going to very likely to traffic drugs. (The fact they choose deterministically is irrelevant).

There is a real difference between being coerced into committing a crime and not. The difference according to most/all court and justice system, most lay people and most professional philosophers is know as "free will". The only group that might not agree are amateur philosophers.

>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do

In the case of R. v. Ruzic

>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.

The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.

I don't understand how you can claim to be able to exercise a will while admitting you have no control over what your your will is. This philosophy seems like a last ditch cope in the face of recent evidence that demonstrates we're puppets of physics and it's so fucking sad how people can't just deal with it.

So kind of a ‘free will of the gaps’ argument?

> The same works for the question of whether you do what you do due to your soul's desire or due to neurons firing - both are true, but work on different levels.

Even if someone knows nothing about neurons, they could argue that free will doesn't exist, because it determined either by randomness or by reasons. "I choose strawberry icecream because I like the flavor. I like the flavor because I'm born that way, or maybe because my mother fed them to me as a baby." (nature/nurture)

> Since the freedom worth talking about is the one that affects our lived experience, the only constraints that matter are those we actively feel, or know about.

This is a good idea that I haven't thought about before! We say that a glass is empty, even though there is air inside it. Language is practical. There is probably a practical distincion between some causes of will (or actions?) and others.

Determinism ultimately means that there only is one possible future. And that all actions will inevitably lead to that future. From an outside perspective we are simply following the laws of casualty.

So “deciding to do otherwise” means creating a different future, one where you has done otherwise than what was predetermined. Idk if that makes more sense.