You’re describing consciousness as something akin to being strapped into a rollercoaster and then pushed and pulled along the track that was built for “you” by your genetics, as if you’re somehow external to them. You seem to suggest that “autonomy” would require the ability to act without a physical body, because you presuppose that deterministic physical laws make physical action impossible to undertake without being wholly controlled by them.

I think you’re insisting on the wrong definition of the self. You aren’t bound by your instincts, they are part of you. Anything internal to you that influences your criteria is simply more you, and not something that gets in your way of making your own choice.

I’m not asking you to pretend any more than is necessary to defeat solipsism. If you can accept that you just have to believe that other minds exists, then it shouldn’t be hard to accept that they (and you) have criteria that are meaningfully applied to their circumstances in what has to be called a choice.

What IS free will if not that? Can you describe what a being with free will would be like?

That's a circular definition, isn't it? There has to be an objective definition, else the word simply does not mean anything. You can't just say that an agent is someone who identifies as an agent.

Also, it's not particularly difficult to directly experience your lack of free will with simple thought experiments. Practices such as meditation break the spell even further. How do you reconcile that?

Its like we today debate on topics without learning. Plato and Hegel both spoke on these topics and Daniel Dennett shows no recognition of their works. Says enough

There are countless fields of philosophy, and in each one you will find academics passionately pontificating on all sorts of questions. But you won't find many people actively arguing that a field is fundamentally wrongheaded, that philosophy isn't relevant to a field, or that a field should be left to others. I contend that this is due to self-selection bias: only the people who think a field is worth philosophical study bother write about it, while other philosophers leave them to their own devices rather than expend time and resources trying to debunk the field - that would be a fast way to lose friends and goodwill. But this then gives the false impression to onlookers that philosophers as a community all accept at least the relevance of these fields. This can then be used as ammunition by anti-philosophers, who can pick the more ridiculous fields and laugh at them. This is unlike in (some of) the sciences where new paradigms are nigh-universally accepted to supercede old ones.

Edit: This isn't to say no philosophers ever wrote criticism targeted at whole fields. They do, it happens. But only very occasionally, and you will have to dive deep into the archives to find it, because it is always vastly outweighed by the amount of research in the field, and at any point in time it will be almost impossible to find any active research being done to debunk fields as a whole.

Ah, then it seems the disagreement is more fundamental, indeed. If you’re arguing from a context in which “you” isn’t defined, then the notion of “will” — free or otherwise — is irrelevant.

But even then, I’m not sure “particles not obeying physical laws” is the most sensible benchmark. Of course they obey physical laws; the distinction is the series of reactions that could occur but don’t.

For example, I’m imagining expanding the previous paragraph. I’ve composed several sentences in my head that would illuminate the point further, but I’m choosing not to do so. I think that may be an example of what we’re calling “free will” here: the ability to chart multiple courses of viable action and selecting one. Your argument seems to be that the chemical composition of my brain prevents me from doing anything but imagining those sentences, but my perception is that I could go on at length if I chose to do so (a tendency many on Reddit would testify to) ;-)

Your explanation sounds quite similar to the reasoning a mentally unstable person uses after they've stabbed a victim and then they blame that victim and say "Why did you make me do this?!".

I am not going to comment on pro-mortalism, as I know very little of it.

———

Now, unfortunately I fear you have only been given or are only producing a strawman of both what anti-natalists is, and what it argues.

To define anti-natalism (AN): the belief that it is wrong to bring new people into existence. (This could extend to all life, if needed). It is not a position on what someone should do once they exist, in how to live a fulfilling life, except for the case of arguing a person should not have kids.

As to why: because there is suffering in existence - this is an important point, most arguments used by AN rely not upon the belief that existence is suffering, but that it has suffering within it. From this premise, we derive some of the following arguments:

• Axiological Asymmetry: Existent Benefit = Good; Existent Harm = Bad; Non-existent Benefit = Neutral; Non-existent Harm = Good. (Benefit and Harm here refer to pleasure/pain, knowledge/ignorance, esteem/esteem-lessness).

The allegory used here is: we do not think it is bad for the people who don’t exist on Mars to have no benefit, but do think it good that non-existent martians are not suffering because of such.

• Wellbeing Argument: Existence is majority or entirely suffering vs benefit - Benatar comments on this, supplying scientific studies showing that people’s memory tends to prioritise positive memories over negative ones, even in the case where their life has been relative hell. It is plausible people’s desire to survive is an evolutionary mechanism which increases the chances of reproduction; a person might be perfectly capable of living an unhappy life, incapable of understanding it as such, if their genes incline them towards ignorance. (I personally disagree with the wellbeing argument holistically, as a metaphysical reality of suffering, but I agree that some people’s lives are hell, that they are blind to such a fact, and, despite their circumstances not altering, these peoples still bring new humans into their damaged situation.)

• Probabilistic-Insecurity Argument: we cannot secure the beneficial, no-harm existence of a person we bring into existence, absolutely; hence we shouldn’t bring them into the world.

• Non-consent Argument: given anti-natalists believe, as well as any other sane person, that existence has suffering within it, bringing people into existence without there consent is regarded as wrong. For an analogy: you run a bath; some of it is boiling, hot, tepid, luke warm, cold, or just right. Without their permission, you throw a person into the gigantic bath, without knowing if they will burn, freeze or relax; this we regard as wrong.

• Damnation Argument: this is only reserved for Abrahamic religions but relies upon two points. Firstly, abrahamic religions accept the premise that our current existence is suffering, and only some form of divine act can save us. If they are wrong, about God’s existence, this still leaves existence to be suffering, hence we shouldn’t bring people into the world. They also believe that if man fails to have a relationship with God, atone for his sins, and submit to God, they may be damned into the endless pain of hell. Given a parent cannot ensure their child’s salvation, it seems irresponsible to possibly doom them to eternal suffering.

There are some other interrelated but non anti-natalist arguments:

• Non-natalism argument: instead of it being an injustice to bring people into the world, there simply isn’t a justification for bring new people into existence.

• Environmental arguments: more people will destroy the world quicker.

• Adoption argument: it is better to adopt the millions of kids without parents.

• Vegan Arguments: less people, less animal food produce.

———

As to why we shouldn’t build an utopia: well, I don’t totally disagree with you. I would personally hold that the hedonistic imperative is an obvious conclusion of anti-natalism, when one accepts that humanity will never be wholly anti-natalist. However, the initial imperative to not have kids still is primary.

Despite this, it does not follow we should accept suffering now for the benefit of future generations. An example of this is the classic: ‘maybe I should have kids because they could be the doctor which will cure cancer or a scientist which fixes climate change?’ - however, it does not follow we should subject another being to suffering to resolve our mistakes.

The important point is that anti-natalism and hedonistic imperitivism are not mutually exclusive positions, as long as the latter does not hold that bringing new people into existence is a predicate for the achievement of their vision. We have no right bringing people into existence to achieve our dreams and desire.

———

I also want to point out that reddit anti-natalists are usually not philosophical anti-natalists. They are often ill-informed 20y old whiners with poor life prospects and too must screen time. If you are engaging with reddit anti-natalists you are probably debating the equivalent of a high-school feminist with daddy problems or neo-conservative with mommy problems; not the serious feminists, conservatives or anti-natalist of philosophy and political studies.

It will happen eventually unfortunately. Already frighteningly close to being a reality.

Ok...so if I feel like I don't have agency then I don't, right? So that means that humans have agency and don't have agency at the same time?

Claiming agency or perspective is not akin to claiming godhood. Be reasonable. Comprehending agency as a concept in light of a deterministic chain of events is about as good as you can get in regards to "free will".

Kinda off topic, but in this context I would believe that someone claiming Godhood in a similar comparison would be doing so from an solipsistic and egotistical perspective precisely because they perceive their own agency but can't or refuses to extend that potential to other people.

People don't even behave the same way on-camera as their off-camera selves. Let alone knowing your thoughts are being monitored.

> What’s the difference between “actually making the choice” and what’s being described: evaluating the options and selecting the one that best fits your criteria?

That’s not what’s being described. What’s being described is having the perception that “you” (whatever that means, since it’s all just particles) are an agent who is evaluating options and selection the one that best fits “your” criteria. Your perception of reality is not reality.

> It sounds like you’re arguing that “free will” is something that’s only discernible externally, regardless of the perception of the agent making the choice.

I’m arguing that the concept of free will does not make sense, and cannot exist. I suppose one could prove a being has free will by observing particles in its nervous system that don’t obey physical laws while it makes choices, but if we’re entertaining that idea then we have a lot of other philosophical and scientific problems.

Dennett's idea of "free will worth wanting" kinda falls short for me, when I know that I didn't choose to be attracted to some weird bipedal creatures with certain visual & other attributes, and know that these features don't have absolute value (positive or negative)--yet I am unable to escape the mechanism that makes me feel certain way towards "good looking" or "ugly" people, and that my emotions, thoughts, and behavior are affected by whether the person in front of me has just the right distance between eyes... how ridiculous and demeaning is it, that the way I feel towards a person is affected by something like that? Or some other factors like familiarity and such like... And I have the "freedom" to choose how I act based on such ridiculous factors? Gimme a break!

Or, the fact that I have the uncontrollable drive to continue this stupid existence, which I have no 'good' rational reason to want to continue--for I know that things I feel attached to, I am attached to not because of some free, rational decisions I've made, but rather, because things "I" (the part of "my" brain writing this) had no way of choosing such as my genes, environment, experience, etc. (existence which frail people try to believe is meaningful, for they'll become unable to get out of bed if they don't believe in it, which results in them becoming unable to satisfy other desires that, if left unfulfilled, 'punish' them, whether it takes the form of loneliness, hunger, thirst, boredom, physical pain, immense fear or worry)

Not to say I want to entirely discard the idea of "praise/blame" or "personal responsibility" as a means of encouraging good behavior and discouraging bad behavior--but to believe I have some "autonomy"... that just doesn't work on me. I wish it did.

> Dennett agrees with all of that… Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined “the freewill worth wanting.”

“I am a hard determinist, but I’m going to take this other thing that isn’t free will and call it free will, and argue that we have that instead (while not always making it clear that I’m not talking about actual “free will” despite using that phrase), as if that’s a meaningful thing to do”.

Going back to basics:

> Some "modern compatibilists", such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.

If everything is determined, the concept of an agent loses all meaning. There is no agent who can make choices. There are just indistinguishable particles. Debating the nuances of what it means to “freely choose to do what constraints allow” is also internally inconsistent if you accept determinism, because we don’t make choices. What we’re left with is “free will is simply having the perception that you are an agent who is capable of choosing to do something that you think is an available choice”, which is just worthless as a position. It means nothing.

What’s the difference between “actually making the choice” and what’s being described: evaluating the options and selecting the one that best fits your criteria?

It sounds like you’re arguing that “free will” is something that’s only discernible externally, regardless of the perception of the agent making the choice.

> He thinks anything outside of imposing god-like powers of control over the world is not free will.

Your perception is so warped that you think the desire to be able to make a simple choice is born of god-like arrogance. If you are representative of philosophy as a field, then Harris is right to disregard its self-indulgent and contrived definitions here.

> If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault?

Exactly. They’re not. We recognise this in the justice system in many ways already. Many jurisdictions give sentence reductions to people whose childhoods were shaped by traumas, or who have mental health difficulties, for example.

> Culpability is out the window.

Whether the person is culpable for the action (or whether the idea of a person is even physically meaningful), and whether we should apply a judicial consequence for it, are not the same question.

Why are you asking these questions in a way that implies they disprove the idea that we lack free will?

> All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do,

But this is circular. If we don’t have agency, then we don’t conduct ourselves. We are conducted as if we have agency.

> What do you want from a “free” choice besides the opportunity to apply your criteria to a circumstance and subsequently act in a manner to best satisfy that criteria?

To have actually made the choice, obviously.

> So what’s the point of denying the existence of free will? To be technically correct about the relationship of cause and effect but in doing so wholly misrepresent the fundamental way that we actually experience reality as subjective participants within it?

Our experience of reality is not reality.

It seems to me your argument boils down to “everyone is indistinguishable from a P-zombie, but we should pretend that the fact that we each experience consciousness means that the fact that we each experience consciousness makes a difference, or is meaningful”.

I don't think I'm smart enough to comprehend a lot of this... But "there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency" sounds like it doesn't exist or maybe we just don't have the mental capacity to understand it yet.

I don't really understand the "if we feel like we have agency, then we have it" idea ...where does that logic end, if I feel like I'm God am I God?

I don't know a lot about this topic so i apologize, I'm sure a lot of my questions have been talked about already.

I am not denying any sort of determinism. What I am getting at is, like with a particle, there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency. Consider recent discoveries in quantum mechanics. Experiments have proven that quantum particles can exist in multiple exclusive states at once (https://www.science.org/content/article/reality-doesn-t-exist-until-you-measure-it-quantum-parlor-trick-confirms). The particle does not collapse into a definitive state until observed. Consider what if the mind is a quantum computer of sorts, with myriad conceptual states coexisting at once in our brains. Surely the concepts are tied to physical states, however they all exist as potentialities in our brains.

There is a certain freedom there at a fundamental level shrouded in that we do not fully understand all of the aspects of consciousness and volition. As with anything you can manipulate a person (impose your will), treating an other as an object, as in a Buberian I-It relationship. Or context can influence a person. However, in many circumstances we are not being overly influenced by context, be it social media, drugs, the full moon, illness, and so on. In circumstances lacking an overwhelming burden of influence on our volitive capacities, I would argue we do have free will, as fragile and at times fleeting as it may be. It’s why Buber raises up the I-You relationship as a preferable way of encountering other beings. Maybe we would all be more free if we could only just stop trying to impose our own will on others. Here’s to hoping Nietzsche wasn’t right that everything is will to power. And maybe all of the above are possible and it’s our choice at any given moment which is real to us?

After working in tech, I do not trust them anywhere near my neurons. I do not need sponsored dreams, ransomware making me forget my kids until I pay a hacker, rolling release schedules of stuff in my head, or getting ddossed, because in meat terms that's a siezure. No thank you. I have seen the quality of code that is the norm.

While trying to digest the source material, the phrase "Tenser, said the Tensor. Tenser, said the Tensor. Tension, apprehension, And dissension have begun." keeps playing over and over in my head. This isn't said for a laugh.

>randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency

This is where the “delusion” comes in, imo. Ultimately, it seems many believers of free will also disbelieve in the laws of physics. You seem to think humans can defy randomness through sheer willpower.

People arguing about whether we have free will or not always turns surreal immediately for me. You're *deciding* to argue about whether or not you have free will. (Someone will argue with me about what *deciding* means. It doesn't matter.)