Recent comments in /f/philosophy

mopsyd t1_j8h24ls wrote

Nah, I'll let the kids have their toys and just go quietly reflect on being a fossil of a bygone era who got to see the science fiction become science reality at the tail end of my primitive life. Seems like a pretty dope ride, all things considered.

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zossima t1_j8h1xuo wrote

My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency, perhaps there is room there for decision-making, even if flawed, influenced and at times ineffectual.

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wolfgeist t1_j8h1aqi wrote

>All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense

You know, I felt like I had no agency before reading this. After reading this, I'm going to make some changes in my life.

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JohannesdeStrepitu t1_j8gtx7b wrote

Could you say what you think Sam Harris' argument is? Asserting that we are puppets or that our attempts to control our thoughts are just illusions are both just ways of re-asserting the conclusion he is trying to defend or ways of asserting implications of that conclusion (in other words, it's just begging the question). What do you take his argument to be for the conclusion that we are not free or that determinism makes us not free?

I'm specifically wondering if he has any more than just an intuition that being caused to do something is being unfree, more than an uncritical, uninterrogated sense that this is just obvious.

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Foxsayy t1_j8grjfb wrote

>Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle like position from initial conditions. [...] I think human agency and free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity and for a sort of freedom.

Currently, we have to assign probabilities for where electrons might be, as far as I understand. So essentially, it's up to chance, randomness. Let's say that they're truly is Randomness in the universe, and could you make the same choice at the same point in time again, you might choose differently.

However, if the only reason that actions are not entirely predictable is because your decisions are being made partially by some Quantum dice roll, how can you call that free will any more than you can choose the outcome of a dice roll at the casino?

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Foxsayy t1_j8gqxzv wrote

>I disagree, respectfully.

Did you explain to me what exactly you were disagreeing with? It didn't seem like you're ideas conflicted with the other comment.

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Foxsayy t1_j8gqici wrote

First, that's attacking the person not the arguement. Second:

>Dennett argues there is often a mistaken conflation of cause and control, and that while every decision might be part of a causal chain, that does not mean our decisions and choices are necessarily controlled. Protecting against manipulation and control on the part of another agent means protecting the only sort of free will that really matters, he claims.

Based on this summary, either Dennis is arguing that our decisions and choices are part of a causal chain, but somehow, they are neither entirely due to that causal chain or perhaps that causal chain and randomness, if randomness truly exists in the universe, OR he's arguing that the type of "free will" that matters is the ability to make our decisions without being manipulated.

The former is extremely unconvincing, and the latter is a different definition of free will, which still fits within a clockwork universe.

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Duebydate t1_j8gq0sg wrote

As I’ve already attempted to reply, if you are being eavesdropped, your thoughts most certainly are probs not free. A line out for listening necessarily means there is a line in for introduction, introducing and literally spelling and telling you which then amounts to jot your brain product of thoughts at all

At that point, whether recognized or not by the human possessing that particular brain, there is no freedom, no possible agencies and choice has forever been removed.

I struggle with why this is a difficult notion. I’ve far more difficulty accepting there is agency and free will as long as the person supposedly possessing it is unaware of their manipulation

To me free will, agency and autonomy must necessarily encapsulate more than just the progenitors BELIEF it is real. Post modernism suggests only a souls interpretation creates a reality

I am firmly in the belief structure that your experience of reality and the outer facts of reality you may not be aware of constitute a more whole picture of true reality.

If one is being influenced, coerced and or controlled by information, it completely influences the truth of the reality, and causality. Just because one may be unaware of causality does not mean it’s not creating false causation. It may create a situation that creates a certain view of reality, but fails in making it true, if how the reality is caused and perceived isn’t known, it’s a deceptive process

Reality exists with facts and truth beyond the simple experience of it if the introduced control is causal, then it may be a reality but the causality is inherently deceptive and absolutely controlled

I think it’s worthwhile for anyone participating here and therefore acknowledging it would even be possible for an individuals’ thoughts to be monitored or even be broadcasted to others around them, to wholly empatheticaly imagine what that would be like for the individual

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JZweibel t1_j8gl5ly wrote

What do you want from a "free" choice besides the opportunity to apply your criteria to a circumstance and subsequently act in a manner to best satisfy that criteria? The inevitability of the outcome of our choices arises from the fact that we can only have one over-arching set of criteria (including criteria about what subsets of criteria to use) and we can only have awareness of one over-arching set of circumstances. So, the only thing "free will" would enable you to do is to act against the interests of the criteria you applied to the circumstance, but what good is that?

Saying that someone only "felt" like they could have acted otherwise doesn't invalidate their application of their criteria to their circumstance. If I COULD order anything off of the menu (at least in the sense that if I said the right words to the waiter then any of the food items would be prepared for me), then fact that I will inevitably get my favorite dish on my birthday, or the healthy dish when I'm on a diet, or the expensive dish when I'm trying to impress a client, shouldn't matter to how we conceptualize my order. If it's MY criteria being applied, that's MY agency, and what comes about is surely at least partially MY fault; inevitable or not.

If anything, trying to get a layperson to "understand that no matter what a person has done they could not have chosen differently" is doing them a huge disservice in terms of encouraging accountability and mindfulness.

So what's the point of denying the existence of free will? To be technically correct about the relationship of cause and effect but in doing so wholly misrepresent the fundamental way that we actually experience reality as subjective participants within it? Fine then, I don't have "free will," but I absolutely have the only kind of "will" that matters as long as I get to apply my criteria my circumstances.

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zossima t1_j8ggw9b wrote

“Voluntariness”… the ethical implications of the assumption free will is nonexistent are devastating to the concept of holding individuals responsible for their actions. If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault? Culpability is out the window. And how can an individual be treated as an end-in-itself if we approach them as nothing but a proverbial wind vane fluttering in the wind of reality? I’m into analogies…

Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle, like position, from initial conditions. That is, considering all factors at a given time, the “reality” giving context to and influencing a particle, we still can never know what is really going on with the particle until it is directly observed and measured. Sure, we know the shapes of electron shells and other aspects in a broader context, but we can never predict the exact nature of an individual particle until we measure it. I think human agency/free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity, a sort of freedom. Particles and minds are different in scale and category, it’s the idea of some undeniable mystery that creates space for very important, ethically foundational concepts to remain relevant. We should work to avoid sophomoric assumptions in any case. And I will point out the idea of free will as outlined above is still very compatible with physical reality in the same way it is for, say, electrons.

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grooverocker t1_j8gbjqe wrote

Dennett and compatibilists at large are not arguing for the existence of libertarian freewill, which is the kind of freewill Sam Harris is good at debunking.

The idea of libertarian freewill (that the will is a law unto itself, free from external causation) either belongs in the category of magical thinking or debunked hypotheses à la phlogiston theory and the luminiferous aether.

Dennett agrees with all of that. Compatibilists agree that the universe is deterministic, that's why they're compatibilists.

Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined "the freewill worth wanting." This stance is what (among other things) differentiates responsibility from inculpability. There are reasons why, in a brute deterministic world, some people are held responsible for their actions while others are not.

It seems to me that there are two misunderstandings incompatibilists often make,

  1. They operate under the old rubric of libertarian freewill in their discourse, in which case they're talking past the compatibilist.

  2. They haven't done their due diligence with the "and then what happens?" component of the two philosophies. This is where the major differences between the two schools show themselves! This is where- I'd argue- you'd find the reasons why compatibilism is the superior philosophy compared to incompatibilism.

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mopsyd t1_j8gaq7x wrote

I am not willing to play ball with unremovable direct human interfacing or any form of two way interfacing with cognition. Some other generation perhaps, but I am not interested and never will be.

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tough_truth t1_j8g4v0z wrote

I agree that the sense of voluntariness is significant for individuals. My critique of compatibilism is only that compatibilists seem unclear on the limits of their domain. It seems that this pro-free will argument applies to the feelings of an individual or perhaps for the convenience of everyday conversation, but falls apart when we consider communities or societies. The feeling that “Jon could have acted differently” is different than saying “Germany could have acted differently”. The more people that are involved, the more they can be modelled as statistically determined rather than agents.

This is because ultimately, we are beings without libertarian free will, or “delusional” free will as you call it. And the farther away we move from our individual frame of reference, the more clear that becomes. I feel like I can choose whether or not to commit a crime, but I know for certain that some percentage of the population will “choose” to commit crimes today. It would be a mistake to assume a whole society could shift based on collective spontaneous individual choice, it is statistically impossible. This does have implications for the way we ought to correctly talk about nations or about widespread social issues (e.g. why do the poor choose to be lazy?).

I disagree with S. Harris about many things but one thing I’ll agree is incompatiblism forces you to take judicial reform seriously. I feel compatibilists skirt around confronting the full implications of having no libertarian free will.

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Devinology t1_j8fzixt wrote

I disagree, respectfully. The idea of moving the world in a god-like fashion is a human delusion, and one that causes us a great deal of problems in terms of interpreting the world around us and ourselves. Arguably, many psychological issues are either caused by, or contributed to, by the delusion that we can control things that we can't (by having a false worldview regarding free will). It has literally no importance for human functioning, because it doesn't make any difference to us in any pragmatic way whether we are truly choosing (in that delusional way) or not.

All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense. Whether we are or not, on the grandest level, has zero relevance for us outside of philosophical pondering. All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do, since ultimately this is all agency is anyway. We don't need any god-like world influencing power for this to work.

I'll also add that under some possible worlds based metaphysical theories, having choice just means that there is at least one possible world in which you've chosen otherwise than you did in the actual world. This allows for compatibilism because it allows for each possible world to be deterministic while also allowing for a genuine sense of agency since for all we know we could be in any of the possible worlds, and which one we're in isn't determined until it plays out, from our perspective at least.

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Duebydate t1_j8fusig wrote

No they in fact do not remain free. If you are being eavesdropped, it’s logical to assume listening in on the “out” pathway assumes there is, indeed an “in” pathway creating at least some “thoughts,” that may, in fact, be contrived introductions

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SvetlanaButosky t1_j8fscw6 wrote

Antinatalists and Pro mortalists argue that as long as even ONE person has to suffer without a cure in this world, then NOBODY should exist, its basically the extreme version of the trolley problem where you MUST always sacrifice EVERYONE (and animals) in order to be moral.

Why? Because ending all lives will prevent any possibly of suffering till end of time and total prevention of suffering is the ONLY value that matters, according to these philosophies.

What about creating a suffering free tech Utopia you asked? Well, their usual counter is that its almost impossible and even if its doable, it will require many generations of suffering and they cannot accept this, they want the perfect Utopia TOMORROW and if you cant make it happen TOMORROW, then they prefer blowing up earth or something similar. lol

What about people who WANT to endure suffering and cherish existence you say? Well, their counter is that most if not all people are delusional and biased about life, their lives are all terrible but they dont realize it, therefore according to some "objective" benchmark for suffering, most lives are actually very bad and should not continue to exist, because they know better than the actual individuals who want to live. lol

Lastly, they will claim that consent is a moral absolute and any violation of consent is wrong and should never be done, no exceptions, this means nobody should procreate because nobody asked to be born. If consent is impossible, the default moral position should be to not procreate, according to this "logic", makes sense? lol

What is your counter argument against these extreme philosophies?

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HumbleFlea t1_j8fh3y8 wrote

No, phenomenologically you felt like you could have acted otherwise. That’s an important distinction. And while an individual’s experience is very important, so too is the truth of the inevitability of all behaviour. Laypeople understanding that no matter what a person has done they could not have chosen differently is of much greater importance than clinging to the notion of experiencing options and calling it free will

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