Recent comments in /f/philosophy

Philosopher83 t1_j7alkgj wrote

this part (italic quote below) (from the first link) did not seem consistent (but I might be splitting hairs) - the second element of it does not seem to follow from the first part. it is too much of a physical to metaphysical jump so the logic doesn't translate well. I don't think it makes sense to suggest that a lack of sensation of free will means that we do not indeed have it, and that we cannot be held responsible. Many people often feel/think that they have less choice or no choice when there is often always a choice - the perception doesn't always correspond with the reality. The definition of agency freedom probably needs to be less constricted. I would suggest rewriting it, considering the logic of the sentence - i.e. it doesn't ring as valid / the logic seems off; you didn't mean it ironically correct? I think it stems from the definition - the meaning of the word 'agency' transcends a persons feeling/sensation. I believe agency has more to do with capacity to act and responsibility for such action - the whole ought implies can discussion in ethics.

"For example, we say that a chair exists because we perceive a chair to exist. We don’t call a chair “something that causes the perception of a chair, but which objectively we cannot call a chair since its existence as such is subject to our perceptions of it.” Instead, we call it a chair.

The same goes for free will. If we do not have the sensation of free will, then we don’t have free will and, therefore, can’t be held responsible."

I think the whole dynamic occurs on a slightly more complex level than this link describes. or maybe I just come at it from a different interpretive priority - I do think we are sort of on the same page in a variety of ways. But, the factors that contribute to behavior are subconscious and conscious so I don't see freedom as the ideal term to use - i see freedom as an overused concept in philosophy, particularly American philosophy. I am unsure how to accurately describe the distinction between the linguistic functions of the terms other than to say that I prefer the term sovereignty as an existentially derived primary right rather than freedom as some sense, quality, or capacity that someone possesses. I am more interested in the primordial existential state of being and how this translates to higher-order ontological principles as axiomatic to normative and political discourse - i.e. how we arrive at the higher-order principle and then see how this relates to our right to self determination and ethics/morality. I did appreciate how the phrase higher-order principles was used, but without a stated basis for this/these principles how can it be objective? The project of objectivity in morality and ethics seems like a faulty way of thinking to me - I ontologically categorize ethics and morality as subjective not objective. I think many people want to base ethics and morality on objectivity because of the concrete priority humans have. I see this as more of a will to power type approach, rather than seeking the necessary relational approach implied by the metaphysical category of being.

it did occur to me that you could be using the term objective in the sense of not being biased - i was using it here to refer to the correspondence our framing has with objective, concrete tendency.

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In the second link I wasn't sure I agreed in part because of definitions and tracking meaning and interpretive priority, but I thought it might be good to suggest that It might bare more fruit to reference and predicate the free will/determinism debate as more spectral rather than as dichotomy. For example, we do have free will in certain ways, but we also have limits to this, which might be considered deterministic. if you think about the it from subconscious to conscious there isn't really a hard line - sometimes we are explicitly aware and other times we are on autopilot - it isn't an either/or proposition. Free will and determinism occur simultaneously at different thresholds of conscious experience.

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x_xwolf t1_j7a8fkn wrote

I think the article may have oversimplifed. Maybe they meant is referring to the more psychologically aspect. Aka the mind. Or the virtualization of your brain. Think like a hard drive on a computer, your hard drive doesn’t actually have a cabinet with files in it. The hard drive is a disk that spins and records data in blocks that can be read from or wrote to. Simulating the concept of pulling a file from a sorted file cabinet. An experience is multiple things to your brain and body, but conceptual it is the sum and recollection of stimuli at the time.

So in theory maybe the article title implies that besides the raw recollection of stimuli, how we subjectively view the experience plays a role.

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WhittlingDan t1_j79vez9 wrote

Then the intimacy was criminalized still not the existence. That case was talking specifically about a sodomy law. If you do not have sex is your existence causing a crime? No. Now was the law intended to target gay people? Absolutely that was the case and it criminalized an important part of intimate relationships. You do not need to have sex to be gay and those people were not "criminalized.". It was bigoted and meant to target gay people by targeting an act that people can do. This really feels like an argument about semantics. Im not against anything relating to gay, straight or sodomy but am a stickler for meaning and clarity.

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Bodywithoutorgans18 t1_j79341o wrote

>its legitimacy is recursive (its legit because enough people say it is)

It is recursive down to a group level and not an individual level though, which makes it stronger than other things that are recursive. "The State" can be recursive down to an individual level, anarchy exists for example. Even within pure anarchy though, there is still some sort of implied social contract.

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VitriolicViolet t1_j792izx wrote

no they dont.

what you are claiming is that all societies in the past were immoral and that any future societies will also likely be immoral (our conception of rights was different in the past and will be different again in the future).

if we all decided tomorrow that all current rights were in fact incorrect then they would be incorrect by definition.

rights and morals are literally determined by popularity and force.

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VitriolicViolet t1_j7923da wrote

>So all one has to do is imagine a different set of rights (say the right to do wrong) and then you have no rights. All this is is "what if we both happened to imagine the same rights?" But what if we don't? What if we had the conflict of John and Bill as discussed in the piece? Do we then not have rights?

yes?

how do you think morals are defined and chosen by societies? through popularity and force.

ie if socialist authoritarism had successfully beaten and replaced capitalist democracy across the globe then it would be considered moral by the majority.

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VitriolicViolet t1_j78y6t8 wrote

i would argue that unless you have the option of opting out of all social contracts then it holds no legitimacy (without the option to leave it by definition is using force and coercion to gain 'consent').

there is no where on earth where you can build your own home 'freely' (ie without paying for permission to the state and being extorted annually)

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VitriolicViolet t1_j78xn36 wrote

its legitimacy is recursive (its legit because enough people say it is) its consented too by birth (assuming you are not moving somewhere else) and when the state breaks it nothing inherently happens, if the population decide the sate has lost legitimacy then it has lost legitimacy.

personally i dont think 'social contract' theory holds up well in the absence of 'no mans land' ie for social contract theory to be legitimate you need to be able to refuse it and all others.

i would argue it currently holds no legitimacy due to relying purely on force and coercion (i cannot build my own home and farm my own food anywhere on the planets surface ie it is illegal for me to leave the social contract as they apply to every square cm of the globe)

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