Recent comments in /f/philosophy

VoxVocisCausa t1_j76vkov wrote

It's important to examine ideas on their own merit and within a vacuum. But it's also important to acknowledge that we carry our own biases and perspectives into our examination of these ideas and to consider why these ideas and thinkers are popular enough that we're talking about them now. Also if we're going to use these ideas as a basis to comment on public policy we need to examine them within the context under which they're being applied. If we want to place Rothbard's ideas within the context they were written we need to consider that on this topic he's writing against a backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement and that while his ideas are often used by Libertarians as a defense of individual rights Rothbard's conception of individual rights was influenced by who he considered worthy. I am not necessarily criticizing OP for referencing Rothbard, who was a prolific and influential writer, but at the same time in the context of amateur discussions of philosophy on this subreddit I don't think it's necessarily out of line to point out the nature of the non-academic organizations who have made his papers available online.

−2

DeusAxeMachina t1_j76u798 wrote

>Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean

This is certainly true, and it is not my intention to discuss all views of objective morality existing before the state, just yours. Which I insist, is Lockean in its conception and justification, as it sees rights as a natural component of reality that is imposed on agents. It is not surprising, considering (as I'm sure you know), Kant's philosophy was largely a response to the Empiricist school Locke belonged to, and he operated from largely the same groundwork as they did. Kant's view is, in the way that matters for this discussion, Lockean, and it is definitely (even more so than your view) not a social contract based view. Thus, my previous argument, that your justifications are not applicable to your view, still stands regardless of whether you personally trace your inspiration to Kant or Locke.

8

contractualist OP t1_j76sq2w wrote

Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean. There are many different schools of thought in meta-ethics. Mine is metaethical constructivism linked here if you would like to read it. You will find references to Kant, not Locke.

3

DeusAxeMachina t1_j76rhyt wrote

If your "social" "contract" (which is, as it seems, neither social nor a contract) is a metaphor, then I'm sorry but you've literally got a Lockean view with an extra, unnecessary step. Let me demonstrate:

Here is a classic Lockean view:

  1. The laws of morality are imposed on us.
  2. Those laws include rights and duties.
  3. We have rights and duties.

Here is an actual social contract based view:

  1. We agree (implicitly or explicitly, but actually) to a social contract.
  2. This social contract includes rights and duties.
  3. We have rights and duties.

Lastly, here is your view:

  1. The laws of rationality are imposed on us.
  2. Those laws require us to exist under a "social contract".
  3. This "social contract" includes rights and duties.
  4. We have rights and duties.

It is immediately apparent that your view is just an extended take on the first, Lockean view. The "social contract" in your view doesn't actually do any explanatory work, and so can't address the problems of justification and source. Your proposed solution is simply taking the solution that would be applicable in an actual social contract driven view, and trying to apply it in a view that, when examined closely, does not feature a social contract at all. When you start talking about "principles that people would reasonably agree to" rather than "principles that people actually (though perhaps implicitly) agree to", you've completely removed the consent element and thus removed your argument from being applicable for consent-based justifications. This isn't to mean that this position is unjustifiable, but the justification will need to be a Lockean one, as you're arguing for a Lockean view.

12

Smallpaul t1_j76r40r wrote

I agree with every individual sentence you say, but in a philosophy subreddit I am queasy about saying we can only evaluate an idea by looking at where the idea came from.

These are two separate issues. You could demolish the idea intellectually and then say “and in case you wonder why such a weak idea was proposed, here is the answer.” But going directly to the ad hominem is sus.

And yes I agree that the NAP is incredibly weak, because it depends on a skewed definition of “aggression” which privileges the rich and makes poor people simply trying to stay alive “aggressors.”

6

VoxVocisCausa t1_j76prbd wrote

NAP is a philosophical trap. In its very conception it's just a simplistic defense of systemic power structures. Also I think it's pretty obvious that Rothbard's rejection of defamation laws was based in his (often vocal) animosity towards black people and I don't think you can discuss his contributions to philosophy without an in depth discussion on white supremacy.

2

contractualist OP t1_j76pnoy wrote

>Again, since your "social contract" isn't really a contract at all, and basically collapses into "rationality,"

"The social contract is a metaphor for the exchange of freedom for reason-based duties." This is what I say in the piece I linked. If you mean a material written contract binding on all, then no, that doesn't exist. If you mean principles that people would reasonably agree to, then yes, those exist and have moral weight, as the linked pieces discuss.

But I argue in the piece why a Lockean conception of rights fail to address the specification, prioritization, and genealogy problems, and how a social contract analysis does (again, its only a metaphor).

1

DeusAxeMachina t1_j76out6 wrote

Again, since your "social contract" isn't really a contract at all, and basically collapses into "rationality," you inadvertently end up with a Lockean view. Having the words "social contract" in your article isn't enough to disprove this point when you do nothing to show the presence of an actual social contract. All it is is terminology salad.

18

contractualist OP t1_j76o2i1 wrote

They are constructed in the sense that they derive from the hypothetical social contract, where free people accept certain reasonable non-rejectable principles (as described here). All of ethics is constructed in this metaphysical sense.

Yet rights exist in that we have certain rights that can be violated, as in reference to the social contract. The piece discusses this in the last section.

1

contractualist OP t1_j76mx2z wrote

If they come from our imagination, they have no moral weight. Your imagination can't make anyone else do anything, like respecting your entitlements. The rebuttal (the answer to the specification, prioritization, and genealogy problems) is provided in the last section.

−9

contractualist OP t1_j76m4jw wrote

This is definitely not a Lockean view of rights, as the article discusses. Instead, it argues that these rights come from the reason based principles of the social contract. These principles create rights (in the metaphysical sense) and we discover them (in the real world sense). And I argue why these reason-based principles have moral weight here and here.

−6

contractualist OP t1_j76lne5 wrote

This article addresses the fact that there are moral laws and natural rights, as in reference to the social contract. Not all ethics is naturalistic. This substack makes the case for ethical non-naturalism here. To provide an analogy, its more like math than science.

1

Due_Example5177 t1_j76jxet wrote

This. I would argue that, as I don’t consent, and as my existence was a crime at birth and until 2003, with the Lawrence V Texas ruling, thus breaking the social contract, the onus is on the State to establish legitimacy by earning consent…or fail at doing so and remain illegitimate.

2